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(last updated September 2006)
Glossary of Terms in Being and Time By Roderick Munday
Introductory notes
This glossary is taken from my 'Explication and Commentary' of Heidegger's Being and Time. It was first published online in February 2006 and was substantially updated in September 2006. It is, however, a work in progress, so please do not expect a definitive list of terms (yet). The citations contained in this glossary refer to the relevant passages in the aforementioned 'Explication and Commentary' and also to the page references found in the 1962 English translation of Being and Time. The full citation of this work is:
The glossary is primarily aimed at persons reading Being and Time in English and consequently German terms are, for the most part, omitted. The primary exception to this is the term "Dasein", which is familiar enough to English readers. Needless to say, I apologise to any German readers - as well as to Heidegger purists reading this! For those seeking translations of the many of the Greek words and phrases in Being and Time, there is already and excellent online resource dedicated to this at Pete's Ereignis site:
Click on a letter to jump to the relevant section in the glossary
Apophantic
A term coined by Aristotle to designate a certain kind of judgement, which, he claimed, could ascertain what is false and what is true about phenomena. However, an apophantic judgement does not arrive at its verdict by comparing true entities with false ones, but by examining and evaluating the entities in themselves. This is why Heidegger was so keen on the method for his phenomenology [ref. ¶ 7, page 56]. Heidegger argues that the comparative methods of judging actually obscures the truth, because it is a placing of something in front of something else. Therefore in order to discover the truth, one must apprehending the being of an entity in and for itself.
Apophantic judgements are made either by attributing a predicate to a subject (insofar as it pertains to the subject as a property of it); or conversely denying a predicate to a subject (insofar as it does not pertain to it), However in both cases the subject and predicates belong to the entity itself and not to something else. Thus, from this ontological basis Aristotle claimed that apophantic judgements could establish the "pure forms" of all possible true (and false) predications and Heidegger claimed by using them he could avoid basing his philosophy on the comparative method of judgment (so that his would not be a mere philosophy of appearances) [ref. ¶ 7, Page 52 - 53]. (This explanation of apophantic was adapted from www.marcuse.org).
Appearance and Announcing
Appearance describes a relationship between phenomena, which is always based on a referral of some kind or other, therefore it is contrary to phenomena that show themselves in their genuine Being. The 'phenomenon' of appearance also shows itself, but its Being is always a reference masking some other kind of Being. [ref. ¶ 7, page 54]
Appearance (as the appearance of something) does not mean something that shows itself, but rather something that announces itself. Announcing can be defined as a 'showing itself by not showing itself,' for example an illness announces itself in its symptoms, which are, so to speak, its calling card. So, in a sense, appearance is a not showing itself (Heidegger uses the term "not" here with the caveat that it is not to be understood as meaning a negation, but as indicating the presence of something unseen). Anything that never shows itself is also something that can never seem. This is why appearance is different from showing or seeming. All indications, presentations, symptoms and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing. Appearance has four distinct meanings.
The point to be made here is that if one defines phenomenon with the aid of a conception of appearance which does not differentiate between these multiple meaning, then confusion is bound to reign! [ref. ¶ 7, Page 52 - 53]
Assignment
(See equipment) Authenticity and Inauthenticity
Authenticity and inauthenticity are what gives Dasein its definite character. Dasein is either Authentic, which, in the sense of my Being, means that I can chose and win myself, or conversely lose and never win myself [ref.¶ 9, Page 68], or Dasein is Inauthentic, which means fleeing in the face of my Being and forgetting that I can chose and win myself [ref.¶ 9, Page 69-70]. Authenticity and inauthenticity do not derive their meaning or value by comparison with anything else, in this sense that they simply are what they are. This means that we cannot speak of them as being determined by any prior considerations or influences, but rather we should think of them as determining these things, since authenticity and inauthenticity are the grounds on which a particular Dasein determines its own possibilies. [ref. ¶12, page 78]
When a particular Dasein talks about its Being, it is in each case "my Being". And because the essence of Dasein lies in its 'to be' it is also 'my to be'. Thus, we talk about Dasein's Being in terms of possibility rather than actuality. But of course describing something in terms of all of the potential ways that it can be, is far more complex than describing it in terms of what it "is". [ref. ¶ 9, Page 67].
The decision as to which way the Being of Dasein is 'my to be,' is something that a particular Dasein will have decided beforehand, based on the constraints imposed upon it by experience (see historicality). The entity Dasein, who's Being is an issue for it, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility
and for that reason it can chose itself and win itself, or conversely lose itself and never win itself, or perhaps only seem to do so. But this choosing and loosing is defined only in the sense that it can be
essentially viewed by Dasein as Being authentic - that is as something which has a reality value that is not relative to or measured by comparisons with anything else. Authenticity stands alone: it is the way
things are. [ref. ¶ 9, Page 68] An authentic Being is its own measure, because it does not have to justify it's existence by comparing it with anything else (indeed, how would it be possible for people step outside of their own lives to do this?)
Dasein exists, either in the mode of authenticity, or inauthenticity. In fact, in saying this Heidegger is claiming that Dasein cannot properly be described as existing in any other state, although he does concedes that Dasein can be said to be modally undifferentiated. However in considering this last remark, I want to point out that this 'undifferentiated Dasein' cannot be said to constitute a description of any positive characteristics, since undifferentiated Dasein would not possess any characteristics at all. The key word in Heidegger's above statement is describe. You cannot describe Dasein itself since Dasein is not a thing that can be pointed at or talked about in the way we can talk about entities which are not Dasein [ref. ¶ 9, page 67]. In order to talk about being at all we have to talk about structures of Being. For example you cannot talk about the Being of a particular Dasein because it is the sum total of all its possibilities, but you can say of Dasein, generally speaking, that it is the sum total of its possibilities and potentials (whatever they may be). This statement is structural because it describes the structures in which Dasein inhabits. This then is what we are looking at when we are analysing Being. The structural map to the territory that is Being. By looking at the map, we can point to certain characteristics that stand out, of which authenticity and inauthenticity are the primary ones. Authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein must be seen and understood in Heidegger's analysis as being a priori (that is as coming before) Dasein's understanding of itself and thus of its understanding of its own existence. However, although not determined by anything prior, authenticity and inauthenticity are themselves grounded upon a state of Heidegger calls Being-in-the-world. [ref. ¶ 12, page 78] (see also inauthenticity)
Average Everydayness
In this history of philosophy, one gets the strong impression that thoughts about existence have always emerged in the rarefied atmosphere of solitary contemplation. As Heidegger quite rightly points out, this attitude is not typical of the way people live their everyday lives. Much of our existence is not spend in reflexive contemplation of our Being-in-the-world, but rather we are immersed in the task of just getting on with our lives. This then is Dasein's mode of average everydayness. However Heidegger considers this ordinary mode of Being, despite being the most unconsidered, to be also the most important. He argues that Dasein is, of course, close to us, (concern about our Being is effectively the same thing as having an "us" inside out head that speaks to us) in this sense, our Being and ourselves are the same thing. But but this also creates a paradox, since Dasein is simultaneously also the thing which is furthest away from us. The fact that Dasein is onto-ontologically prior (to its own thoughts about itself), means that Dasein's own structure of Being is effectively concealed; hidden from view. But, when we speak of it in terms of a pre-ontological understanding, Dasein is hardly a stranger to us. [ref. ¶ 5, page 36 - 37]. This pre-ontological understanding is Dasein's average everydayness. Thus Heidegger argues that average everydayness should not be neglected in a philosophical analysis and Heidegger tasks himself discovering various methods whereby we can gain access to this kind of understanding. Here's what he has to say about average everydayness. Average everydayness, that undifferentiated character of Dasein, is not nothing, but is actually a positive phenomenological characteristic of this entity, that is its averageness: The averageness of Dasein makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity. No doubt the reason that the averageness of Dasein has been passed over again and again in philosophical explications of the human condition is because it is so unremarkable. But this almost tautologically sounding statement in fact underscores
the truth in Heidegger's maxim, "what is closest to us ontologically is at the same time the furthest away" [ref. ¶ 5, page 36]. In order to understand that which, phenomenologically speaking, is the closest thing of all, it has to be articulated in a way that means 'the closest thing' is not overlooked, but seen rather in its positive characterisation. [ref. ¶ 9, Page 69]
Dasein's average everydayness is therefore not to be taken as an aspect
of it. Dasein comports itself towards its Being in the mode of average
everydayness, and the understanding of this is felt by Dasein even
before it can even be articulated in thought. Average everydayness' does not carry the usual hazy indefinite connotations that these words have in ordinary speech. In the explication of Dasein anything that is understood
ontically can be thought of as existing in an average way and
this mode may be grasped in patterns of existence. These
are Patterns which Heidegger terms 'pregnant structures', which may be
indistinguishable from an authentic Being of Dasein, in
other words Dasein choosing and winning itself by comporting itself
towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. [ref. ¶ 9, Page
69-70]
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Being
Since the whole of Being and Time is an attempt to answer the question,
"What is Being?", it would be a little presumptions of me to attempt a summary
here. However, there are three preliminary remarks that can be extracted from
the ontological tradition
in philosophy, that will help us initially to clarify the question:
1/ "Being is not a genus". 2/ Being is indefinable. 3/ Being is self-evident Subsequently Heidegger elaborated a more considered conceptualising of Being into five characteristics:
1/ Dasein is a Being who understands that it exists, and what is more the Being of Dasein is, in part, shaped by that understanding.
2/ The above statement can be seen to serves as a working definition of the formal conception of existence,
3/ Dasein exists and moreover Dasein and existence are one. For example if Dasein is 'the human Being' and existence is 'the world,' then Dasein and the world are one. The consequence of this is that Dasein and existence cannot be separated - even analytically separated.
4/ Dasein is also an entity which I myself am. In other words each one of us (as human Beings) defines existence in terms of our own existence, a concept that Heidegger terms Mineness. Therefore the only way that Being can be understood is as My Being.' This applies even when Being and Dasein are considered in general.
5/ Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, in the sense that how I regard 'my Being', creates the conditions that make authenticity and inauthenticity possible. [ref. ¶ 12, page 78]
Being alongside
As an existentiale, Being-alongside-the-world does not mean the same thing as the-Being-present-at-hand-together-of-things-that-occur. "There is no such thing as the side-by-sideness of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'World,' for that would imply that they were separate 'things'". Of course when speaking ontically about two things, a kind of side-by-sidedness applies; we can say for instance that "the table touches the door" or "The chair touches the wall" because the two things in those examples can be present-at-hand together alongside one another . Although the word 'touch' is problematic in these instances for two reasons"
1/ in actuality, two separate things cannot 'touch' at all, because there is always going to be a minute space between them, even if that space is perceived of as nothing.
2/ Because the usage of the word 'touch' is an anthropomorphisation. In the sense that when talking about entities, tough used as a metaphor to connotes a human closeness. In other worlds the very sense that belongs only to an entity like Dasein. See also worldless [ref. ¶ 12 page 81]
Being in From the perspective of our common sense understanding, "Being-in" is a term we usually associate with our involvement in a situation or a context. Thus, "Being in" is not thought about solely in isolation, but in terms of "Being in something or other". For example we can say that: the water is in the glass, However, in terms of inness the description cannot be terminated with that proposition for is not the glass also in the kitchen, which is in the house, which is in the village, which is in the county and so on until we realise that, in terms of inness, the glass (and everything else described) are actually located in worldspace. Thus, the inness of "Being-in-the-world" or to put it more precisely, this inness can be defined as, "the-Being-present-at-hand-as-things-within-the-world". This present-at-hand type of 'Being-in' can be further isolated into "Being-present-at-hand-along-with". This sense here is that the Being-present-at-hand describes a definite relationship of location, where something exists with something else; both having the same kind of Being. This sense of 'Being-in' thus can be used as a way to describe patterns of existence and is therefore an example of a characteristic in our way of looking at things categorically [ref. ¶ 12, page 79]
Being-in does not suggest a spatial relationship of the "in-one-anotherness" of things present at hand, anymore than Heidegger's use of the word primordially signifies a spatial relationship. [ref.¶ 12, page 80]. As Heidegger later points out the spatial quality of an entity can only be clarified in terms of it Being part of the structure of worldhood, not as its apriori spatial condition. This conception is contrary to Kant's famous transcendental phenomenology which regards space and time as the a priori conditions that make the perception of reality possible. Heidegger contends that we will not be able to discover the world if we take spatiality as its grounding apriori condition [ref. ¶ 14, page 93].
Being-in-the-world
Being-in-the-world is the grounding state of Being. It is the fundamental ground upon which every other determination of Being rests. Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which therefore is necessarily a priori, although it should nevertheless be understood that Being-in-the-world is not by itself a sufficient determinate of Dasein's Being for the reason that Dasein's Being can only be truly understood in the future sense of the my to be. Being-in-the-world therefore describes the formal understanding of the ground on which Dasein's Being stands. It can only elaborate the broad principles upon which any actual Dasein operates, rather than describing the Being of any particular Dasein with precision.
Being-in-the-world is a compound expression, but it names a unitary phenomenon. It underscores the fact that in Heidegger's philosophy 'Being' (the Being of Dasein) and 'the world' are not separate entities but must be grasped together. In this sense, there is no subject and object, nor is there any division between internal and external. However, structurally speaking, this does not prevent us from talking about 'Being' and 'the world' separately, since the structure of Being-in-the-world consists of items which actually may be looked at in three distinct ways:
1/ in terms of the world or Worldhood.
2/ In terms of Who - the entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it exists is a "who."
3/ In terms of Being-in = This conception looks at the ontological constitution of the "Inhood" of Being-in. [ref. ¶ 12, page 78 - 79]
Being (The formal understanding of)
The answer to the question "What is Being?" in a formal (general) sense is obtained by noticing the connotations of inness as a dwelling place found in both the word In (inn) and the first person conjugation of the very "to be" -"I am." In German this is "ich bin," where "bin" is associated with 'bei', [act], so "ich bin" means "I reside," or "I dwell alongside". Thus, in terms of Heidegger's ontology "am" also means "dwell alongside," or "I reside," when expressed as an existentiale. In the context of 'Being-in,' the way that this 'alongside' is meant is in the sense of, "I reside alongside the world." The "world" here connotes both 'familiarity with' and concern for' the things that I reside alongside with. The "I" in these significations has the characteristic of "I myself am". Thus "Being-in" stands for those things which are familiar to me. "Being", as the infinitive of "I am", signifies "to reside alongside."
The fact that the answer to a general "What is Being?" question is that Being is "I reside alongside", perhaps strikes us as rather strange since I reside alongside seems like a very particular expression, and the temptation is to cut the "I" completely out of the formulation and talk in terms of Being as a general residing alongsideness. However in Heidegger's formulation of Being the "I" represents the wholeness of Being and therefore 'I' is a general term. This is a paradox of Heidegger's philosophy (in the literally sense of the Greek word paradox as meaning against orthodoxy). The paradox is that the pronoun "I" is not to be thought of as designating a singular or particular entity. This is because everything is grounded on the wholeness of Being and general, and therefore general ontological structures are described in the seemingly particular terms of mineness. In order to grasp this we must set aside all associations between the "I" of minenss and the "I" of Cartesian subjectivity, and indeed the "I" of the first person singular also.
In Heidegger phenomenological conception, the infinitive of "I am" signifies "to reside alongside" and in this sense Heidegger conceives of Being as that which we are familiar with. Therefore, the formal expression for the Being of Dasein can be expressed as I reside alongside myself or I myself am. This formal understanding has Being-in-the-world as its essential state. Although we must, again, remind ourselves that looking at the structure of Being is not the same thing as looking at Being itself. Here the distinction implied by "the map is not the territory" very much applies! [ref. ¶ 12, page 80]
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Care
Care is synonymous with Dasein because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein. In actual fact, this is what is meant by the meaning of Being conceived of as "I reside alongside"--see Being (the formal understanding of). Dasein's Being is always looking out towards the world is therefore is essentially manifested in care and concern. And also the ontological conception of Being-in as the "alongsidedness of things," suggests both their close proximity to Dasein, and also their intimate intertwining with Dasein.
In making the Being of Dasein visible as care, care itself must be taken as an ontological structural concept. In this sense, care has nothing to do with its everyday significations of "trials and tribulations", or "being bound up in the 'cares of life'." Although, it is true that ontically we can come across these aspects of care in every Dasein. And, like the opposite state of 'gaiety'-- which in its true signification means 'a freedom from care'--they are only possible because Dasein is synonymous with care when understood ontologically. [ref. ¶ 12, page 84]
Category
Entities present-at-hand within the world are understood ontically and their characteristics can be arranged into categories. Dasein on the other hand is understood ontologically and its characteristics are arranged into existentiale. The difference between existentiale and category is both in the way they are used (existentiale applies only to Dasein, category applies to entities within the world) but in the different paradigmatic assumptions (the differences between an ontical and ontological understanding) that underpin them. In traditional philosophy, categories are defined as tools for analysis. For example, in Aristotle's Organon, categories enumerated all the possible kinds of thing which can be the subject or the predicate of a proposition. The classical Aristotelian view that claims that categories are discrete entities characterized by a set of properties which are shared by their members. These are assumed to establish the conditions which are both necessary and sufficient to capture meaning. Therefore the tradition of categorisation instigated by Aristotle, ideally illuminates a relationship between the subjects and objects of knowledge (source - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorization). The use of categories is predicated on the assumption that reality can be studied by slicing it into parts and grouping those parts into sets, based on some perceived similarity between the parts. In the traditional philosophical paradigm, this slicing is not seem in terms of doing violence to the 'wholeness of reality', for the wholeness of reality is considered to be a mystery that needs to be taken apart and analysed in order to be understood. In addition, one also has to bear in mind that the violence of cutting up objects for study in this way in no way effects the person who is studying them. Since this person, as a subject, is detached from the objects of study and emotionally indifferent to them. However in Heidegger's ontological paradigm, such distinctions collapse and therefore the assumptions upon which are based also collapse. HEIDEGGER'S DEFINITION
Concern The ontical meaning of concern comes in three colloquial significations:
1/ 'to carry something out,' or 'to get it done.' 2/ 'to provide oneself with something' and 3/ 'to be concerned about the success of the undertaking'. In contrast to these ontical significations, the ontological expression 'concern' designates - the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. Thus concern is an existentiale and the term has been chosen because it allows us to make visible the Being of Dasein as care. Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself into definite ways. A primary characteristic of Dasein is that it is a Being concerned with its own existence. [ref. ¶ 12, page 84]
Covering up
Covering up is the counter-concept to phenomenology. There are many senses in which a phenomenon can be covered up.
1/ Hiddenness 2/ Burying 3/ Disguise Furthermore covering up, whether in terms of hiddenness, burying or disguise has two additional possibilities:
i/ Covering up which is accidental
ii/ Covering up which with the best of intentions gets 'lost in translation' when immediate experience is represented in language.
In the latter case, the Being of the entity gets understood in an empty way because its ownmost Being gets lost. [ref. ¶ 7, page 60 - 61]
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Dasein
Dasein is one of the core terms in Being and Time. It can be simply defined as entity that is conscious of the meaning of its own existence. In practical terms, this means the human being is Dasein, since, arguably, no other life-forms on the planet are conscous of thier own existence. For example, it is argued that no other animals buries their dead. Here are some passages which illustrate how Heidegger's utilises the concept of Dasein.
Dealings
Heidegger's contention is that the Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited phenomenologically, if we examine how these entities are used in our everyday Being-in-the-world. If this task is undertaken, Heidegger asserts that we find our relationship to entities always manifests in terms of care and concern. Thus dealings evokes this notion of Dasein's relationship with things of value is being based on care and concern. [ref. ¶ 15, page 95]
Discourse
The denotative meaning of Discourse is "talk". In the ontology of ancient Greece, man's Being is defined by its potential and capacity for discourse. Talk is therefore for Heidegger the clue for discerning those structures of Being which we encounter in addressing ourselves to anything or speaking about anything. [ref. ¶ 6, page 48]
In ancient Greek, Discourse means to make manifest, in the sense of revealing what one is talking about in the discourse. In this way discourse was similar to the ancient Greek definition of Logos (words/language) which also meant 'to show something', or 'to let it be seen', (Aristotle called it uncovering). Thus the Greeks defined the function of language (the logos) in terms of the 'making manifest' of discourse.
In the discourse, the 'that,' which is made manifest is discourse itself. This underscores the fact that discourse is never a fiat (a fiat is an act of creation by speaking, like in Genesis, Chapter 1, verse 3, when God said "let there be light" and there was light). In reality however, the things one talks about are not actually created or called into being merely by the talk. Discourse, in this sense, is therefore 'just talk.' However, things which do not exist, (like ideas and myths) can appear to be existent when announced in discourse, for example we can talk of 'pink elephants' or 'pigs that fly'. In this sense discourse makes these things manifest and seemingly real. For example, a person who is troubled by a problem is advised to get it out into the open by talking about it - "a problem shared is a problem halved." But the reasoning behind such advice is predicated on a notion that Heidegger is trying to articulate here. Namely that discourse objectifies thoughts and presents them as things which show themselves and can therefore be dealt with for straightforwardly as we deal with other existent things in the world. [ref. ¶ 7, page 56]
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Entities
The term entities is used strategically throughout Being and Time, so that Heidegger can avoid talking about "things". This is because the term "things" already presupposes an understanding of their existence, which Heidegger thinks is false and seeks to contest. As he points out, we are on dangerous ground even by addressing entities as 'Things', for in doing so we have "tacitly anticipated their ontological character". This was, in a nutshell, the mistake of Descartes and his forebears. Heidegger argues if you talk about the world in terms of things, the only "thing" you are ever going to uncover is the totally erroneous conception of the "Thinghood and Reality." [ref. ¶ 15, page 95]
Environment
Dasein's everyday world is what we call the environment. The word "environment" is made up of the prefix 'environ,' which designates a space. Therefore, it seems obvious that a spatial character incontestably belongs to any environment. However, Heidegger argues the word environment does not have a primarily 'spatial' meaning. In fact its spatial quality can only be clarified in terms of the structure of worldhood, not as its a priori condition [ref. ¶ 14, page 94]. The environment and nature itself (as that which is environing) is discovered in any work which is ready-to-hand:
(see also spatiality)
Equipment (and assignment)
In our everyday existence, we encounter equipment of numerous sorts for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement, etc. Heidegger defines equipment as, essentially, 'something in-order-to'. Structurally, this in-order-to describes what Heidegger calls an assignment, that is and process which employs 'X' (a piece of equipment) to achieve something 'Y' (a task). The term assignment' indicates that a piece of equipment is made visible in its ontological genesis, Now, you may say that a piece of equipment is always visible, "Is not a hammer something that is quite obviously there before us?" The answer is no, for the reason that a rock, or a piece of wood, or even a human fist, can serve just as well as a hammer on occasions. Therefore, jumping to the conclusion that a hammer is an object, a mere "thing," is precisely the mistake people make when they view equipment purely in material terms. Strictly speaking, we can say that there is no such 'thing' as a piece of equipment. In fact, equipment only becomes truly visible as equipment through its use, i.e. in the act of assigning from 'X' to 'Y'. [ref. ¶ 15, page 97]
Equipmentality
In Heidegger analysis of equipment he presumes two things:
1. That the kind of Being which equipment has must be exhibitable in some way, and
2. If we can identify this, we will be able to defining its value.
These assumptions will be our first clue in defining what turns an entity into an item of equipment - in order to discover the entity's equipmentality. [ref. ¶ 15, page 97]. However, we have to understand that in our dealing with equipment, its equipmentality is not grasped thematically as a verb - we cannot understand what a hammer does merely by miming the action of hammering in mid air, for to do this would be to disregard the piece of wood, the nail, in other word, its equipment structure.
Equipment Structure
Any 'individual' item of equipment only shows itself in a metonymic sense of being a part of a greater system - something which Heidegger calls its equipment structure. To the Being of any equipment there already belongs a totality of equipment. For instance the equipment of hammering is not merely a hammer, but an nail, piece of wood, workbench, lighting, furniture, windows, doors, room. However, we do not usually consider this totality of equipment, eventhough the task of the particular piece of equipment under consideration could not be performed without it. Thus, we can say there is always an aspect of the equipmentaility of equipment which includes the totality of equipment needed for a particular assignment, but that this totality usually never shows itself if equipment is regarded only in its material sense as a thing. If we take an example of a less that obvious piece of equipment, a room, we can say that the room is both a piece of equipment (to paraphrase Le Corbusier - a machine for living in) and is also a collection of other equipment that comes together to constitute a room. Of course a room is not normally considered in terms of equipmentality, but rather as the space 'between four walls. Hence we easily fall into the trap of considering the room philosophically in terms of the abstract notion of space, and therefore not in terms of the more everyday notion of it as a piece of equipment. [ref. ¶ 15, page 97 - 98]
(For more on this last remark, see also spatiality)
Everydayness
Exhibiting
Exhibiting is nothing else that the Being already at hand, in other words, the being of existent things shows itself. Exhibiting is equivalent to our understanding of Being as a "taking a look beforehand" - or the understanding we take from things before we articulate that understanding back to ourselves as thoughts [ref. ¶ 7, page 25] (see average everydayness). This 'showing' of existence lies at the bottom of any procedure of addressing oneself to thoughts of an entity, or in our discussing it. Additionally, in the context of apophantic judgements, the logos in the mode of exhibiting can also become visible, in itself, as a relation to something. [ref ¶ 7, page 58]. Exhibiting is absolutely necessary for the for Heidegger's phenomenology, for to have such a science means to grasp its objects in a way so that everything about them, which is up for discussion, is both exhibited directly and demonstrated directly. [ref ¶ 7, page 59]
Existentia, Existence, Essentia
We will examine these individually in a moment but it is very important to understand how the meaning of these three terms is distinguished, since Heidegger's analysis of Dasein depends on it:
Existentiale (Existentalia)
Existentalia (plural) are certain characteristics of Dasein that are revealed by the analysis of its existence. In Heideggerian terms, an existentiale (singular) concerns Dasein's residing alongside the world and its involvement with entities within the world which is always expresses in terms of care and concern [ref. ¶ 12, page 82]. Normally, if we were analysing anything entity other than Dasein we would use the term category. But Heidegger forbids this, because Dasein is not like any other entity (Dasein is, in fact, the ground upon which the perception and conception of everything else rests) and therefore Dasein needs to be analysed in a different way to other entities. The existence structure of Dasein must be defined existentially. Heidegger
therefore wants his 'existentalia' to be sharply distinguished from the concept
of 'category,' as it is ordinarily understood [ref. ¶ 9, page 70]. 'Existentalia'
and 'category' are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being. The
entities that correspond to them are these...
1/ Existentialia = Dasein
2/ Categories = Entities that present at hand, i.e., not Dasein
It is important to realise that these two terms require different kinds of primary interrogation. In other words, any entity that is either a 'who' (existence) or a 'what'
(present-at-hand) is treated differently. [ref. ¶ 9, page 71]
Using the existentiale we may discern some notable patterns in the manifold impressions of Being. These patterns can be articulated into principles with which we can define (broadly) the phenomenological manifestations of the Being of Dasein. This is systematising and in this sense the existentiale is a conceptual tool which allows us to form a certain hypotheses which also have a legislative function qua Being. In other words, these hypotheses concerning the structure of Being in general can be used to make predictions. Thus, the functions of the existentiale (both systematising and legislative) are similar to the functions of the traditional category in philosophy. Where they differ however is in the philosophical assumptions one has to take on board before one applies them. [ref. ¶ 12, page 82]
Existentiell
"Existentiell" refers to someone's personal understanding of their own existence For an individual Dasein, the question of existence never gets clarified except through existing. The understanding of oneself that we acquire along the way Heidegger calls "Existentiell". [ref. ¶ 4, page 33]
Extential
"Extential" refers to a more general understanding of existence.
The question of existence is close to Dasein, but this does not mean that Dasein is necessarily conscious of the question of existence. But the structuring of the question "What is Being?" points the way for the formal analysis of what constitutes existence. The context of such structuring we call "Existentality". But its analytic has the character of an understanding which is not extentiell, i.e. structure plus content. But extential: structure minus content. [ref. ¶ 4, page 33]
Existentiality
The word existentiality is derived from existential, i.e., the formal understanding of Being in general . By "existentiality" we understand the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist. But the idea of such a constitutive state of Being already includes Being as its core component. And this is the reason why we are prevented in working out the general answer to the question, "What is Being?" before the question itself has been answered. [ref. ¶ 4, page 33]
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Factically
A Heideggerian term for which we can usually substitute "in fact" [ref. ¶ 2, page 27], but which also references the concept of facticity
Facticity
An understanding of specific structures in advance comes from Dasein understanding of its ownmost Being, in the sense of regarding that as a certain 'factual Being-present-at-hand.' In other words Dasein understands its existence as a fact. And yet this kind of fact has quite a different ontology from the factual occurrence of some thing - for instance like the existence of a type of a mineral in the ground. Things present-at-hand exist in worldspace but nevertheless are worldless, thus we can talk about them ontically and arrange them into categories. However whenever Dasein "is", the isness of Dasein is also a Fact; and the factuality of that Fact is what Heidegger terms Dasein's facticity . (Apologies for the all the double-barrelled concepts in that last sentence. All their presence means is that there is a reflexive (self conscious) aspect to discussing one's Being. Thus, to be conscious of one's own existence implies that one is conscious of that consciousness, if you see what I mean)
Facticity is a term which stands for a definite way of Being, and it has a complicated structure which cannot even be grasped by people who have a naive ontological understanding. The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the world' has Being-in-the-world so that it can understand itself and its Being-in. That is it understands itself, as if it is bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within the world.
The facticity of facts like the Beingness of being underscores the point that there is a reflexive component to existence as I have already mentioned. This is something which points to the existence of an interpreter, "myself," who is bound up in the apprehending of the world and the self. In traditional philosophy the adoption of the paradigm of objectivism makes us miss the fact that the interpreter (subject) and interpreted (object) are bound up together in their Being. Moreover, the traditional 'objective' paradigm denigrates the role of the interpreter, because its perceptions of the world are described as being "merely subjective".
In Heidegger's ontological paradigm, however, the subject does not exist and therefore there cannot be any subjectivity either. Although this is not to say Dasein is not prone to error in perceiving the world, for that would deny the ability of the world to surprise Dasein. Rather, what Heidegger's is saying, is that there can be no facts that exist independent of people perceiving them as such. [ref. ¶ 12, page 82]
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Grasping
Grasping is the simple awareness that something present-at-hand has the temporal structure of a pure 'making present' of something. In the grasping, those entities which show themselves to be present-at-hand are therefore understood as entities in the most authentic sense. Presence then is literally an interpretation of something with regard to the present (immediacy of perception). [ref. ¶ 6, page 48]
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Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics = the science of interpretation
Heidegger asserts that a phenomena can be grasped in and for themselves in immediate perception. The function of language (logos) is to reveal what phenomena show. However language has a different Being from the phenomena it describes, so the danger is that language will only a 'appear' to tell us what the phenomena is. In other words, the inherent danger of describing phenomena in language is that the Being of language (because it is different from the Being of phenomena) can effectively a cover up the being of phenomena.
Therefore, in order to sort out the covering up of language from the truth of language, we need a method of interrogating language which is both systematic and reflexive enough to hopefully alert us to any potential covering ups. This method is what Heidegger calls, "hermeneutics," or the business of interpretation. As Heidegger asserts - our investigation will show that the meaning of phenomenological description, as a method, lies in interpretation. It is therefore through hermeneutics, as a systematising approach to interpreting, that the authentic meaning of Being can be articulated. Language, in the form of words (logos), when it represents the phenomenology of Dasein, always has the character of hermeneutics. [ref. ¶7, page 61 - 62] There are three points about this to bear in mind.
Historicality Historicality is a determining characteristic of Dasein. It stands for that kind of Being that is constitutive for Dasein's 'historising.' For it is only on the basis of Dasein's sense of its own past that anything like a 'world history' is possible. [ref. ¶ 6, page 41]
Dasein is constituted by its past experience in the world, whether a particular Dasein is conscious of this or not. For instance, someone who is fighting depression because of abuses in their childhood might not be aware that these experiences are the cause of her depression (until revealed in psychoanalysis perhaps), but they are part of her history and therefore actually constitutive of her present state of Being. Thus, all that Heidegger is basically saying here, is that we are shaped by our past experiences.[ref. ¶ 6, page 41]
Dasein, in terms of its my to be, is always orientated in its Being towards the future. Being is always in this sense a "to be". But the concept of Historicity also implies that Dasein views its future possibilities and potentialities as being a territory which is delineated in terms of past experience and, moreover, this is Heidegger claims actually where the notion of "past" comes from. [ref. ¶ 6, page 41]. In other words, past experiences are what set the boundaries for future hopes and dreams. This is why the notion of the past is so important for Dasein. It takes on an urgency because it is actually constitutive of Dasein's "to be." In this sense, the notion of the past does not exist for us in the sense of being something
'dead and buried'.
Dasein's being, although it exists primordially in the present, is constituted by a notion of the living past. Thus the Being of Dasein exists in notions of the 'past' and the 'future,' which are very much alive and therefore for that reason are also fundamental to Dasein sense of its own existence. In fact, Dasein's very consciousness of its own Being is shaped by what it has done, and what has happened to it as much as by what it hopes, intends, or feels compelled to do. The point to bare in mind here is Dasein's motivation in its 'my to be' is always deliniated by historicity - "In the fact of its Being, Dasein is as it already was." [ref.
¶ 6, page 42]
Histrocity (Histrology) A type of inquiry through which Dasein can discover its Historicality. Histrology means the explicit study and preserving of tradition. The study of tradition can be taken hold of as a task in its own right. In this way, Dasein inquires into its history, but this kind of inquiring is only possible because historicality is in fact a determining characteristic for Dasein itself [ref. ¶ 6, page 41—42].
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Inauthenticity
Heidegger calls Dasein's mode of average everydayness an inauthentic mode of Being. But the interesting thing about this inauthenticity is that it comes before the conscious realisation of one's Being, where ideas of authenticity and inauthenticity might be thought to originate. In Heidegger's analysis, Being is not a judgement, because one cannot assess it retrospectively. Rather, our understanding of Being is something we carry with us even before thinking. However, Heidegger's analysis of the inauthentic still carries with it a judgmental aspect, but in this case the judgement designates a mode of Being characterised by Heidegger evocatively as Dasein fleeing in the face of its Being "and forgetting thereof. This implies that one's ownmost search for one's possibilities of Being can be easily distorted by a mode of inauthenticity, that is of not facing up to and acknowledging the meaning of one's existence. [ref. ¶ 9, Page 69-70] (see also authenticity) Inness
This is a concept related to the Being in of Being-in-the-world. According to Heidegger's research into linguistics, notably his consultation of Jacob Grimm's Kleine Schriften (Small writings, link in German here). According to Grimm, the German word "in" derives its meaning from the English word "inn" which means 'to dwell'. Grimm discusses both the word "in" and the phrase "in und bei" and goes on to compare a number of archaic German words that take their meaning from domus (the Latin root of the English word 'domicile', or 'dwelling'). Heidegger notes that all these words are similar in form to the old English word "Inn" and claims that "in" therefore derived its primordial signification not as it is usually understood from a preposition, but from a verb. The verb in question is "innan," which in old German meant 'to reside', and whose meaning is therefore also similar to the Latin habitare, which means "to dwell". In English we still retain this sense of "inn" to mean "a place of rest", for example, the Holiday Inn chain of hotels. Heidegger also examines the meaning of the word "Am" (the first person conjugation of the verb "to be"), This word is derived from the German "ann" (again discussed in Grimm). 'Ann' is from the Latin colo, which also means habitare - in other words the "an" (in English "am") has a similar meaning to "inn". Ontologically speaking, habitare stands for "being accustomed" in the sense of "I am familiarity with" and "I look after.... something'. [ref. ¶ 12, Page 82]
Interrogating
Interrogating is a mode of questioning where the goal is not so much obtained as constantly deferred or reflected back onto the questioner. All inquiries are inquiries about something, which is also a questioning of that something. So, in addition to what is asked about, there is also a sense of that which is interrogated. In this case, inquiry itself is also about the behaviour of a questioner, and the reciprocal relationship that gets established between the questioner and the questioned. Both has their own character of Being. And both therefore must be examined if we to understand the true function of interrogation. When one makes an inquiry one may do so casually, or one may formulate the question explicitly. The latter case is the more peculiar, because the answer to question is never really clarified until all the elements of the question have also been made transparent in and of themselves [ref. ¶ 2, page 24 - 25] Investigating
Investigating is a mode of questioning which is concerned with the attainment of a goal. The goal can be formally conceived of as "laying bare the nature of the question." This is a type of questioning Heidegger calls "expressly theoretical". [ref. ¶ 2, page 24]
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Logos
In ancient Greek, Logos meant "words," but in its modern conception, logos is taken to mean words in the sense of language generally. There has been much debate in modern philosophy as to whether the function of language is to name a pre-existing reality or actually forms our conceptions of reality itself (see Saussure, Wittgenstein etc). Heidegger's position in this debate is unusual in the sense that he deliberately positions himself outside of a dualistic conception of language vs. reality. Heidegger asserts rather that Language and reality, (by which he means the phenomenal conception of things as being present in themselves) should be conceived simply as different things. Language is itself a phenomenon (possesses its own Being) which is different from the Being of the phenomena it describes. However, the purpose of language is to grasp phenomena in the world, and language's ability to do this (is other words its fidelity to things in the world themselves) is not really questioned or problematised in Heidegger's analysis in the way that it is in, say, Wittgenstein's.
The function of the logos is simply letting something be seen, and for this reason logos can itself signify reason. Moreover, because the logos is used, not only with the signification of grasping (perception), but also as something which is exhibited (showing), the logos can signify that the thing to which one addresses oneself becomes visible in itself in the address. Logos, thus, acquires the signification of both a relation and a relationship. This relationship and relation are self supporting in the sense that one does not have to compare them to anything else in order to perceive them. Heidegger therefore considers the primary function of the logos is to exhibit the kind of relationships present in apophantic discourse. [ref ¶ 7, page 58]
Even using the phenomenological method it is possible that entities which are primordially within our grasp may become hardened into concepts that cover up the presence of the entity. If this happens, the entity is no longer grasped in and for itself, and therefore becomes an appearance of that entity. Heidegger points out that this is the difficulty with this type of research, there is always the need to be mindful of the possibility that language will cover up the Being of phenomena, or has done so already, and thus phenomenologyical method must always be self critical and interrogative. [ref ¶ 7, page 61]
(see also Hermeneutics)
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Mere appearance
Mere appearance is something that indicates the existence of that which does not in fact appear, and never will appear. For instance, Kant's notion that space is purely an idea is for Heidegger a mere appearence (see spatiality). This sense of appearance can be defined as being tantamount to the "bringing forth" of something which does not in fact constitute the real being of an entity. This then is appearance in the sense of "mere appearance". In the case of mere appearance, that which announces itself can be likened to an emanation of what it announces, but in all cases the thing which is being announced is kept constantly veiled by the announcement. [ref. page 53] However Heidegger asserts that, in every case, the phenomenological conception of phenomena can be brought to show itself. [ref. ¶ 7, page 54 - 55]
Mere semblance
See semblance
The Being of Dasein is the Being of each human individual. Thus for the individual 'Dasein' we can say that the Being under investigation is in each case mine As the translators of Being and Time note the reader must not get the impression that there is anything solipsistic about this statement. Heidegger is merely pointing out that the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is the kind of Being that each and every one of us relates to in terms our concept of the self. This means that Dasein never thinks about Being in an abstract way, (that is a mere appearance) but rather Being is delivered over to Dasein as an "I myself am." In other words, when we talk of Dasein: your Being, his Being, her Being, their Being, our Being is fundamentally understood in terms of my Being. [ref. ¶ 9, page 67]
To designate Dasein, the personal pronouns "I" and "you" will always be used and likewise, when Dasein is addressed, Heidegger will always say, "I am" or "you are." Dasein is never to be taken as an instance or special case of some entity (or genus of entities) which is present-at-hand because this would violate the principle that Being is wholeness. In our pre-ontological understanding of our ownmost Being, this fact is grasped before any other precepts can be inferred and, for this reason, it cannot be violated retrospectively and cut up into categorical distinctions like it is in traditional analysis. On the other hand, a kind of categorisation is approapriate to the Being of entities that are not Dasein, because their Being is a matter of indifference to them. [ref. ¶ 9, page 67-68]
When addressing Dasein, the personal pronouns: "I", "you" and "us" should always be used (see Mineness), But in addition, we also need to be aware that when a particular Dasein talks about Being, it is in each case "my Being". However by saying "my Being," Heidegger is not implying that Being is a property of Dasein, in the sense of designating one's ownership over one's Being. But rather, Being is that from which Dasein is itself constituted [ref. ¶ 4, page 32]. Being, therefore, has 'belonged' to Dasein long before Dasein could think about notions of ownership.
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Nature
Heidegger claims that nature cannot give us phenomenological access to the world because nature is already an entity encountered within the world. In other words, nature is itself a component part of a greater whole that we call the world. If we try to define the world in terms of nature, the problem we face is one of not being able to escape the frame of reference from within which the inquiry itself is conceived. Therefore the primordial phenomenal access to the world is discovered, not in nature, but in equipment. What happens is equipment is used first and and 'Nature' is discovered along with its use as a surplus quality we find in natural resources [ref. ¶ 14, page 92].
So there is always a residual quality to nature, something present-at-hand, which becomes apparent only after nature has been discovered as a resource. Although this surplus is, paradoxically, the very thing that allows us to contemplate that which has been discovered as a 'something' in its own right. What Heidegger has done here is reversed the normal conception of nature, as something which is taken up (exploited) by humanity in the form of natural resources. However, he argues the problem with this view is it can never make visible the resource structure of nature itself, which is actually what defines the relationship of Dasein towards nature. And thus, nature is always conceived of a something metaphysical (It is a thing that exists, but one can never quite pin down its existence to objects). The advantage of considering nature as a resource structure has over metaphysics, is that we make visible the entity known as nature, and also the means to which we are granted access to it in the first place (with all the attendant notions of myth, beauty sublimity that surround our post-industrial romanticisation of the natural world). [ref. ¶, page 100]
(see also ready-to-hand)
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Ontic (ontical)
Ontic inquiries are concerned with knowledge about entities that are not Dasein. [ref. ¶ 3, page 30] In traditional philosophy, this can be conceived as as seeking "facts about things." The term 'ontic' is used throughout Being and Time in a more technical sense to distinguish Heidegger's assumptions about the Being of entities from the paradigmatic assumptions underpinning traditional philosophy. Thus, ontic is a way or articularing Dasein's understanding of the entities that are not Dasein, but nevertheless matter to Dasein, as entities Dasein is concerned with [ref. ¶ 4, page 32] (see also category, Being-alongside, care.)
Ontology
Ontological inquiries in philosophy are concerned with Being, Heidegger uses ontology in a specific sense, as being synonymous with his phenomenological method. This similarity is expressed in the maxim,"only as phenomenology is ontology possible" [ref. ¶ 7, page 60]. Phenomenology is the way we access ontology, and it is therefore also the way we can give the study of Being demonstrative precision. In the phenomenological conception of phenomenon the Being of entities--its meaning , its modifications and its derivatives--are revealed. [ref. ¶ 7, page 60] Onto-Ontological
The structural understanding of Being. Being in particular cannot be adequately conceptualised, because it can only be understood in the future tense, as a my to be. Given the fact that there is no way to isolate all the variables of the my to be of a particular Dasein, all we can do is uncover the broad principles upon which the Being of Dasein in general rests. This is not itself an ontological inquiry, it is an ontic inquiry about an ontological inquiry - hence the term, onto-ontological.
Ownmost
In the context of the human Being, our ownmost Being is the inner-consciousness that constitutes the 'meness of me'. In the context of Being in general it is however its most primordial and authentic aspect. Therefore "own", when used in the sense that it is use here, is not meant as "belonging to Dasein", that is to say it is "a property of," but rather it is something fundamentally constitutive of the Being of Dasein itself. [ref. ¶ 4, page 32]
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Phenomena (phenomenon)
The ancient Greek expression phenomenon is derived from the verb "to show itself". To show itself, in ancient Greek, also connoted "bringing something to the light". In this sense, phenomenon signifies, "that which shows itself in itself." This signification of phenomenon alludes to the fact that an entity can show itself for itself in many ways, depending on the kind of access we have to it. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something it is not. The use of the term "phenomena" is restricted in Heidegger's usage to designate only those things that show themselves for themselves. Other forms of showing are given the terms seeming and appearing
. [ref. ¶ 7, Page 51]
Phenomena when understood phenomenologically are nothing but the fragments, so to speak, that go to make up the whole phenomenon of Being in general. I choose the word fragment here to liken the concept of a particular Being to the fragment of a broken mirror. A fragment of a broken mirror is, in terms of its substance, merely part of a greater whole (the whole mirror). Yet in terms of what it reflects, the fragment can not be differentiated, since the part can potentially reflects the same scene as the whole. The variable in this case if what way you view the fragment. We can push this analogy to its limit and say that an appreciating Being in general is dependent on how you view the individual Being. As Heidegger says, Being in general is always the
Being of some entity or another. In other words, if we find a way to view the reflection in the mirror that 'belongs' to it and all its fragments, then we are able to see the nature of Being in general. Therefore, in our investigation of the meaning of Being, we should first bring forward entities in themselves and discover their Being. For the two reasons:
1/ there is nothing behind phenomena and
2/ phenomena cannot lie.
Therefore all entities must show themselves phenomenologically in themselves and for themselves with the kind of access that genuinely belongs to them. [ref. ¶ 7, Page 61]
Phenomena (the formal conception of)
Heidegger defines phenomena as "that which already shows itself in appearance, as prior to the conception of phenomena,". In every case the phenomenological understanding of phenomena is that it can be brought to show itself. This ideas is, in a sense, the antithesis of the Kantian bracketing of phenomena into empirical phenomena and mental phenomena (noumena). Heidegger argues that there is no purely mental phenomena, and that which is considered as such, can be shown to have a worldly referent (using the phenomenological method). For example, see his analysis of the world and spatiality, as being derived from the totality of equipment, resource, work and product structures, embodies in the notion of nature being ready-to-hand.)
Heidegger supplies a few general pointers for how we should proceed towards a formal conception of phenomena:
Being is not the Being of this or that entity, but the Being of all entities [ref. ¶ 2. page 25]. However, this truth can be easily forgotten. However, when Being of entities is treated phenomenologically its ownmost Being is revealed, and thus its fundamental characteristics are revealed. In fact these are the very characteristics that phenomenology attempts to grasp thematically as its object.
This is precisely why Heidegger argues that his investigation requires the phenomenological method. Put succinctly, the phenomenological method uncovers that which, proximally and for the most part, remains hidden in the investigations of traditional philosophy. [ref. ¶ 7, page 54 - 55]
Phenomenon as Semblance (Seeming)
The primordial phenomenological signification, of "to show itself for itself" is still included in semblance. Only when something makes a pretension of showing itself, can it actually show itself as something which it is not. [ref. ¶ 7, Page 51]
Phenomenological method (phenomenology)
The term Phenomenology is a compound made up of the Greek words for phenomenon (thing) and logos (word). Taken superficially it is formed in the same way as all the 'ologies'--biology, psychology and the like--which can be translated as "science of...". Thus, biology equals "science of life," psychology equals "science of mind" etc. -- this would then make phenomenology the "science of phenomena." Phenomenology expresses a maxim: "to the things themselves." This maxim invokes a principle which should be the mainstay of any science, namely that nothing is self evident. Entities should be examined in and of themselves, without any preconceptions or prejudices, in order to ascertain what they are in their most primordial sense. The fact that phenomenology (as the science of phenomena) seeks to question the self-evidential qualities of entities, also implies that it is prepared to cast light upon the its own processes of investigation. Thus the expression phenomenology signifies primarily a methodological conception, not of the 'what ' an object is, but of the 'how' of the research - i.e., how do we form an understanding which constitutes the 'what' of an object? [ref. ¶ 7, page 49 - 51]
Phenomenology designates neither the 'object matter' nor the 'subject matter' of its study. The signification of phenomenon, as conceived of both formally and in the manner in which it is ordinarily encountered, is such that any exhibiting of an entity, as it shows itself in itself, may be called phenomenology. This neither implies nor confirms a subject/object relation assumed by logic. In fact, such dualistic distinctions collapse under the scrutiny of the phenomenological method. This means that phenomenology (as a science of things) is intrinsically different from the all the other sciences who designate their objects of study according to their subject-matter.
To have a science of phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them, which is up for discussion, must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly [ref. ¶ 7, page 59]. The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the mode of phenomenon is one which must first of all be wrested from the objects of phenomenology. This is actually the point of departure for the phenomenological inquiry. This places the phenomenological method in direct opposition to a naive sense of immediately and unreflectively beholding. [ref. ¶ 7, page 61]
Philosophy
Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms in fact characterise philosophy itself with regards to its object and its way of treating that object. Heidegger, therefore, considers philosophy to be a universal phenomenological ontology, that takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, defines the trajectory of all philosophical inquiries, both at the point where they arise and the point to which they return. [ref. ¶ 7, page 62]
Praxis
Heidegger notes that praxis was the Greeks term for things (when pertaining to our concernful dealings with them). But he remarks also that the Greeks left undisclosed their specifically 'pragmatic' character, instead, thinking of them more concretely as 'mere Things.' This is why Heidegger notion of equipmentality and of assignments is not expressed in terms of praxis [ref. ¶ 14, Page 96 - 97].
Pre ontological
What we have in mind when we speak of Dasein's "Being ontological" is actually to be designated as something "pre-ontological". This is because it signifies being in such as way that one already has an understanding of Being. The kind of being towards which Dasein comports itself we call existence. Productive logic as discussed above is an example of a pre ontological understanding. In this case it can be argued that the discoveries of all the sciences are indebted to the logic of Plato and Aristotle who first outlined the importance of a systematic approach when studying phenomena [ref. ¶ 4, Page 32].
Presence
The Being of entities can only truly be grasped in the present. Once we attempt to re-present the immediacy of Being in through the mediation of language, the 'present' of an entity, becomes instead a 'presence' in language. However, this conception of representation verses reality does not imply the usual critique of representation found in modern epistemologies, such as semiotics. The semiotic paradigm criticises 'mimesis', (or the Platonic idea that language and art is an imitation of reality) as naive because it ignores the fact that things in the world do not tell us what they are, in fact we have to invent names for them and semioticians argue that the idea of the thing only emerges after it had been named [see Saussure: 1983, 114]. But Heidegger does not seek to alert us to the epistemological problems of 'presence' being a copy or otherwise of the 'present', instead he merely emphasises that the two differ in terms of their Being. However, this ontological distinction does not necessarily cast doubt on the fidelity of language to represent reality.
Grasping is the simple awareness that something present-at-hand has the temporal structure of a pure 'making present' of something. In the grasping, those entities that show themselves present-at-hand are understood as entities in the most authentic sense. Presence then is literally an interpretation of something with regard to the present (immediacy of perception). [ref. ¶ 6, page 48]
The ancients, interpreted Being as orientated out towards the world and towards "nature." This interpretation was obtained in terms of time. The outward evidence for this (although merely outward) is the treatment of the meaning of presence in ancient Greek philosophy. Presence has an ontologico-temporal meaning which can be expresses as entities, grasped in their Being, as presence. Thus they can be said to be grasped in the 'present'. [ref. ¶ 6, page 47]
In the ontology of the ancients, existent entities--the kinds of things that one simply comes across in the world such as rocks plants and animals--are taken as the basic exemplers for the interpretation of Being. The ancients grasp this Being of entities in the form of words. And this is considered the acceptable way to grasp entities. But Heidegger cautions that the Being of those entities must be grasped in a certain way, that is to say in a certain type of speech that lets something be seen. This is the only way that the Being of a given entity can become intelligible to us. The sighting of an entity in words also means that it can have a kind of presence which can be recalled by language to stand for the object in circumstances where the object itself is no longer present. This presence can also be talked about, say, when we wish to interpret the object by elaborating upon some aspect of it that was not apparent in the initial sighting. We can do this because the original sighting in language has a fidelity to its object which can be elaborated upon, so that aspects that were initally not remarked upon can be legitimately discussed, even without the object being directly present. [ref. ¶ 9, page 70],
[additional ref. Saussure, Ferdinand de (1983), Course in General Linguistics, Roy Harris (Translator) London: Duckworth Publishers]
Present-at-Hand Heidegger's term for something that exists. There are three kinds of presence-at-hand identified so far:
Primordial
Heidegger uses primordial and primordially in a sense that is vaguely synonymous with "truth" and "truthful." Primordial is that which is closest to the essential nature of Being. [ref. ¶ 3, page 30]
Productive Logic
In science, basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of all the objects that a particular science takes as its theme. For example, in biology the concept of "life" defines all biological inquiries as well as its fundamental categories. All positive investigation in the sciences is in face guided by this principle. Here, the work of Plato and Aristotle is evidence enough of how a systematic logic was elaborated, which later became the basis of the scientific method. This laying the foundations can be described as a productive logic, in Heidegger's words, it "leaps ahead into some area of Being and discloses it for the first time." A productive logic is what gives us the conceptual tools to understand certain things, which we might not have perceived had this systematic way of looking at things not informed our understanding beforehand. In this sense, the idea of a productive logic is akin to appreciating the advantages of a systematic way of looking at things, as opposed to a more ad hoc approach. One the appreciation of a systematic methodology is realised and formalised into a scientific method. Real scientific progress is made because the systematic (logical) approach is conducive to forming a cumulative understanding of knowledge. This is an understanding to which each new discovery contributes to [ref. ¶ 4, Page 32].
Proximate (Proximately)
Proximate is more commonly known for its antonym - approximate. Just as approximate means a roundabout impression of an object or an idea, proximate means a precise and accurate one.
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Questioning
Heidegger defines questioning as "a cognisant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to its Being as it is." Heidegger reminds us that the 'question of Being' is not just any question, it is the question, in the sense that it belongs to every other question. To understand the question, "What is Being?", we must uncover the commonalties in every question, so that what is peculiar about questioning can be made transparent. Every inquiry is seeking and the journey of seeking is guided beforehand by what is sought. [ref. ¶ 2, page 24 - 25]
Ready-to-Hand (Readiness-to-Hand)
The kind of Being which equipment possesses and the way in which it manifests itself, Heidegger calls 'Readiness-to-Hand.' Readiness to hand does not merely occur in the act of using equipment. But rather, equipment is only manipulatable in the first place because it has this kind of 'Being, in itself'. However the readiness-to-hand of an entity which leads us to consider it as a piece equipment is only discovered by using it - never beforehand. This is the paradoxical nature of equipment, for no matter how long and diligently we stare at its outward appearance, we will never be able to discover anything ready-to-hand about a piece of equipment unless we actually take it up and use it. For example, it is only when we take up a hammer, in order to hammer, that our primordial relationship to the hammer's equipmentality becomes apparent . The act of hammering itself (and the context in which this action occurs) is therefore what uncovers the specific 'manipulability' of the hammer.
The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand means that, in terms of an entity being a piece of equipment, its "thingness" must, as it were, withdraw in order to for it to be ready-to-hand in an authentic way. The hammer, as a thing, becomes transparent in the hammering. In this sense, it is as if it becomes an extension of the human arm, for when hammering we can almost feel the nail, and the resistance of the hammer. [ref. ¶ 15, page 98]
Resource Structure
Related to the notions of equipment structures and work and product structures is resource structure. The work to be produced is not merely usable for something. The production itself is a using of something for something (The work of the tailor is the use of the equipment structures of tailoring to produce a shoe).
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