On Reading Being and Time:

This illustrates that the ready to hand, is not fixed, nor is it bound to the object itself, but rather the solutions to the problem may be many and varied because they are located in involvement structures. And when the solutions is discovered it is the right solution, (even though it may be one of many) because it is premised on the structures of involvements that make up the world for us.

In this ontological context it does not matter whether and entity is involved or not, or if it is an entity that is not yet existent. (For ontically speaking to say that something does not exist is to say that it is not involved at all).Ontologically those entities are those with which we concern ourselves when we do not let them 'be' as we have discovered them, but that work upon them, make improvements in them, or smash them to pieces.

When we speak of having already let something be involved, so that it has been freed for that involvement, we are using a Perfect tense a priori which characterise the kind of Being belonging to Dasein itself.

As a reminder for those whose grammar is a little creaky, perfect tense formed by using the word ‘have’ plus the past participle of the verb. For example, ‘I have let something be involved,’ or ‘She has begun to understand Heidegger.’

'Letting an entity be involved,' if we understand this ontologically, consists in previously freeing it for its readiness-to-hand within the environment. (118) A 'thing' is never 'world-stuff ' that is merely some 'thing' present-at-hand. Our concern encounters it as ready-to-hand. Heidegger describes this as a relation: the extent that an entity shows itself to our concern, is the extent to which it is discovered in its Being. Therefore it is already something ready-to-hand for it to be considered a thing.

Discoverdness

Discoverdness is Heidegger's term for a possibility of Being which every entity without the character of Dasein may possess.

Discoverdness is really the hook on which this argument hangs. Discoveredness is a concept which we implicitly acknowledge the presence of an involvement in every act of creation or inspiration. This involvement is experienced as the feeling that our creations did not come sui generis from out of our heads but from somewhere else entirely. Permit me to illustrate this with a personal example. For example I write songs for the pleasure and challenge of doing something creative. On occasions a song's birth is a long and arduous process. Although at other times, a song can be written in the time it takes to play. When this happens it is accompanied by a feeling of pure elation. This I liken to experiencing discovery in its most powerful form. For the dominant emotion attached to discovery is astonishment - "How did that happen?". The feeling of astonishment derives from the sense that it is not me who was in control of the process of giving birth to this song. Although I was notionally its author, the song came from somewhere else. The act of creation feels like the realising the existence of something which is already there. It may sound rather grand to say it, but I think the role of a songwriter is to help the song sing itself into existence.

The Ontological Priority of Involvements

If the Being of something ready-to-hand is to be discoverd, an involvement itself has to be discovered. And this occurs only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements. So in any involvement that has been discovered what we have called the "worldly character" of the ready-to-hand, which has been discovered beforehand.

Therefore In this totality of involvements discovered beforehand, there lurks an ontological relationship to the world. In letting entities be involved so that they are freed for a totality of involvements, one must have disclosed already that for which they have been freed. And it is no surprise to discover what the primary 'for the sake of which' from which the structure of involvements emerge is Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Past, present and future belong to this Being. In terms of our existence then we can say that, 'Dasein,' 'Being' and 'the world' are all that ever were, or is, or will be.

But the world itself cannot itself be conceived as an entity with this discovered kind of Being. Because there always has to be a "for which" in order that something ready-to-hand can been freed. Since in terms of the world, there can be no further regress, no uncovering that which is before Dasein and the World. The world itself is therefore essentially not discoverable as an entity, since there is no assignment to free the world for the world in its Being.

Thus I presume that by the same prohibition Dasein is prevented from discovering itself, and so too is Being - except in the general, structural sense that Heidegger has outlined.

Dasein's Understanding of Being

But what does it mean to say that that for which entities within-the-world are proximally freed must have been previously disclosed? As Heidegger has already stated Dasein is that which has a reflexive understanding of its own being, thus: to Dasein's Being, an understanding of Being already belongs.

Any understanding has its Being in an act of understanding. If Being-in-the-world is a kind of Being which is essentially befitting to Dasein, then to understand Being-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of Being.

The previous disclosure of that which we encounter within-the-world results in the subsequently freeing of an entity within the world. This amounts to nothing else than an understanding the world, towards which Dasein as an entity always comports itself. The horizon of understanding is therefore constituted by the understanding of Dasein and the world, and since there can be no further involvements beyond Dasein's Being-in-the-world, this is a horizon beyond which nothing can be said to exist.

(119)

Intelligibility

Anything which serves as the basis for involvements, must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility. And it is only with a certain intelligibility of the primordial involvement that every other involvement is subsequently disclosed. Or to flip this around, intelligibility designates Dasein's awareness that every new involvement is grounded on a previous involvement and the ultimately all these involvements have to be grounded on something which is the primordial involvement. This involvement is the primary 'towards which' of Dasein's involvement with the world - the wherein in which (119) Dasein understands Being-in-the-world pre-ontologically?

The authenticity/inauthenticity of Dasein assigning itself

Being in the world as the primary 'in order to' clarifies why the authenticity or inautheticity of Dasein is the ground on which Dasein's Being stands, so to speak. In understanding a context of relations, Dasein assigns itself to an "in-order-to", and it does in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is.

We all are aware, to a greater or lesser extent, of the strengths and limitations of our Being. This knowledge is what determines the kinds of choices we make in our lives. Code deontologies like the ten commandments are premised on the fact that we have a choice. Although these ethical codes presuppose that the choice is essentially between right way and the wrong way - not a choice at all, in any meaningful sense. Heidegger also presupposes a binary distinction based on a choice between authenticity and inauthenticity. Dasein can chose itself and win itself, or conversely lose itself and never win itself, or perhaps only seem to do so [ref. ¶ 9, Page 68]. Of the choices presented here, seeming to live an authentic life collapses into inauthenticity, so the choices are really only two: living an authentic life or living an inauthentic one. Is this really a choice at all?

The wherein of Being = the phenomenon of the world

The "wherein" of Being is an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself to itself and lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements;

This is where Dasein itself becomes, as it were, the piece of equipment assigned to itself, for the job of realising itself in the nexus of involvements that is the world. The wherein of Being is where Dasein lets itself in the first instance Be involved. Here is where Dasein frees itself as an entity within the world.

The "wherein" of Being is Dasein's involvement with the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is also what makes up the worldhood of the world.

The wherein of Being is therefore no just where Dasein frees itself but where Dasein frees the world also, since Dasein and the world are reciprocally involved with one another.

The Ontological Structure of The World

Now that he has further clarified the purpose of worldhood, Heidegger's task is to articulate the ontological structure of the world. His first move is to emphasis again that Dasein always assigns itself, "for-the-sake-of-which" a "with-which" of an involvement..

The worldhood of the world

The structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what is important here not the actual assignment. This structure is what makes up the worldhood of the world and it is something Dasein is always primordially familiar with. This familiarity with the world (structure) does not necessarily require that the relations which are constitutive for the world should be theoretically transparent. However, the possibility of giving these relations an explicit ontologico-existential interpretation, is grounded in this familiarity with the world; and this familiarity, in turn, is constitutive for Dasein, because it constitutes the wherein of Dasein's understanding of Being.

In so far as Dasein has set itself the task of giving a primordial Interpretation for its own Being, it can be seized upon explicitly and this is how we will begin to make the possibilities of Being theoretically transparent, and indeed approach and understanding of the meaning of Being in general.

120

Dasein's assigning of itself

But as yet our analyses have done no more than lay bare the horizon within which such things as 'the world' and 'worldhood' are to be sought. If we are to consider these further, we must clarify further how the context of Dasein's 'assigning-itself' is to be grasped ontologically.

Disclosedness

Heidegger first manoeuvre is to examine the act of discovery itself. The word discovery presupposes that no find is absolutely novel. For the absolutely novel lies outside of our understanding. Therefore discovery is linking one involvement with another. The act of discovery is also one of understanding. The understanding it that Dasein realises that the relations which are discovered when it lets something be involved must have been previously disclosed. This is the true meaning of discovery after all. In fact Heidegger says that any act of understanding is the purposeful grasping and holding of these involvement relations in their disclosedness. Disclosedness is Heideggarian term related to discovery, that underscores the fact that new knowledge is derived from discovery of new relations between involvements rather than things. Disclosedness therefore can be regarded as Dasein purposefully attempting to hold these relations before itself, in order to understand them. Through this action of disclosedness Dasein discovers how its various assignments operate in relation with one another. Disclosedness is therefore the understanding that lets Dasein make assignments both of these relationships and in them.

Signifying and Significance

The relational character which these relationships of assigning possess, is one of signifying. The existence of an involvement is like a sign, in that it can be used to point to the existence of other involvements. Once one understands the necessary inter-dependence of structures involvements, all one needs to do is look for them - this is letting something be involved. But on a more primordial level, Dasein 'signifies' to itself giving to itself both its Being and its potentiality-for-Being. Dasein also signifies to itself an understanding with regard to its Being-in-the-world. The "for-the-sake-of-which" signifies an "in-order-to"; this in turn, a "towards-this"; the latter being an "in-which" of letting something be involved; and therefore also, the "with-which" of an involvement.

This sentence is so difficult to follow because there are no objects in it, and therefore nothing to orientate the reader and guide her interpretation. In fact this is because the objects are superfluous and potentially misguiding. Heidegger is more concerned that you notice the structure than get hung up about what these assignments actually are. All of the "towards which" and "for the sake of which" terms he is using undermine the potentially thingly character of the nodal points in these structure, while emphasising the structures of involvements themselves, as well outlining how they interconnect. These structures are the very structures of our Being. They represent the resolutions we make in the case of authentic Being, or avoid making in the case of inauthentic Being. And they determine our personal conduct in our life. Still it may be argued that this could be expressed a little more clearly. Which is quite true, but Heidegger has other reasons of keeping this deliberately vague which will be discussed in section B or this part. For now it will suffice to realise that this is important do not try to pick it apart too much yet. I think the best way to appreciate what Heidegger is talking about is firstly by thinking on what discovery means. For here is an instance where we implicitly acknowledge the existence of pre-existent structures. And secondly realising that these structures do not lie outside of us, but are in fact shaped by us as part of our very being.

Significance

These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality; This system of relations, so to speak, between Dasein, Being and the world is what it is because Dasein, Being and the world are what they are. They can be discerned as a 'signifying,' in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The self evident proposition that "I exist" presupposes that I have existence in a world which also exists. For if it were otherwise it would be hard to discover what existence is (this is one of the problems with Descartes famous cogito ergo sum). For the statement "I exist" to mean anything, "I" and "the world" must already exist before the realisation can be thought - this is the relational totality of this signifying we call 'significance'.

Significance is what makes up the structure of the world-the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is.

Dasein, and its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering anything that it encounters within the world in terms of involvement (In fact the discovery that I exist is the sin qua non of involvements. It is the primordial involvements that is the ground upon which all the others are built. And it is in this involvements that we discover the primordial ready-to-hand, that which Dasein itself is ready-to-hand for.

Dasein reflexively encounters itself in these involvements as the kind of Being that can make itself known to itself as it is in itself. Dasein, as such, is always something of this sort and a context of the ready-to-hand already having been discovered along with its Being,. Dasein, in so far as it is, has always submitted-' itself already to a 'world.'

If we flip this proposition around, we can also approach a definition of the phenomenon of the world. The world is that which Dasein has already encountered and submitted to and this act of submission' belongs essentially to its Being.

(121)

Dasein's capacity to understand and interpret

But in the significance itself, with which Dasein is always familiar, there lurks the ontological condition which makes possible Dasein's ability to disclose such things as 'significations.' This ability, more properly these abilities for there are two, are Dasein's capacity to understand and interpret. For Dasein is after all separated from other beings because of its ability to understand and interpret. These abilities then are what sets the ontological condition for disclosure and the significance, thus disclosed, is an existential state of Dasein. That is to say, a state of its Being-in-the-world. As such it is also the ontical condition for the possibility that a totality of involvements can be discovered.

Significance comes before Language

Interestingly, Heidegger also adds that the Being of words and of language is also founded upon these abilities. This is a big claim, as it suggests the ability to understand and interpret significance comes before language. Which means that language makes no fundamental contribution to our understanding of significance itself and that therefore there is no reciprocity between the sign and its reference. However, I think it can be convincingly argued that this process is dialectical rather than a causal. If we take the example of a road sign warning of animals crossing [my example ¶17, page 111] we can say that, while it is true signification needs to be experienced before a sign can be put up, It can also be argued that an understanding of the role of the sign itself (to signify this significance) it at least as important as an understanding of the significance itself.

Magical Thinking

Heidegger seems to refute this. He posits a simple determination: significance comes before sign. But I think the converse can just as convincingly be argued. In the case of magical thinking, for instance, this reciprocity between the sign and the significance was consciously exploited. The witch doctor or shaman would attempt to evoke the significance merely by producing the sign in rituals. Heidegger interestingly forestalled any legitimisation of this line of inquiry by disparaging the consideration of magic as being important (see his remarks on 'primitive Dasein' [ref. ¶16, page 112 - 113]). And yes, here we can argue that the realisation of significance must be in place before it can be reversed in the magical ritual. But I ask, what kind of significance is this. Is it a preconscious something that lacks a means of expression? Or is it and significance that can be articulated in language? Heidegger suggests it is the former. But is this unarticulated significance by itself powerful enough to determine the means of its articulation? Or does it need to be articulated in order to realise its own power? In other words does the power of significance not grow in being expressed in signs? Is this process then not dialectical?

Money

If the case of money is examined, I would argue that we can detect the remnants of this magical thinking in our own society. For the way we regard money has been subject to a dynamic change over time, which I argue is illustrative of the dynamic dialectical relationship between the sign and the significance contributing to the power of both in the history of our culture. In medieval times there was little or no money and it was made of precious metals like gold. Therefore money did not signify value since it was already valuable in itself. However, it was not until the twentieth century that the indexical relationship between gold lodged in the bank of England or in Fort Knox in the US, was dropped in favour of a completely symbolic relationship of monetary exchange. And what better symbol could you have of this then the credit card? In conclusion I argue that money is an illusion and yet we treat money as if it were still made of gold. Therefore I pose this question, if the relationship between significance is a simple determination, and such a strong one that even language is formed out primordial significance. How is it that the relationship between the sign and the significance can be subject to such a dynamic changes and even reversals over time, as in the case with magical thinking and money?

A system of Relations?

In this last section, Heidegger has seemingly determined that

1/ the Being of the ready-to-hand is definable as a context of assignments or references (involvements),

2/ so that even worldhood may so be defined.

Does this not mean that there exists no 'substantial Being' of entities within- the-world, but instead that all this Being consists of it a system of Relations?

Does this not mean also that the Being of entities within-the-world has been dissolved into 'pure thinking'? Inasmuch as Relations are always thought of rather than perceived directly,

The answer to both these questions is no, but the explanation is complex. Remember in section 4 that Heidegger outlined four possible ways of perceiving the world:

1. World signifies the totality of things which can be present-at-hand within the world.
2. World signifies the Being of those things within the world.
3. World is the place where a factical Dasein 'lives.
4. World designates the ontologico-existential concept of Worldhood [ref. ¶14, page 93].